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McKay: Practice and Procedure

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
JuLus W. McKAY*
HARRY M. LIGHTSEY, JR.**
H. SIMMONS TATE, JR.:' * *
PRE-TRIAL

Change of Venue
In two cases the Supreme Court considered the question of
venue in civil actions. The case of McMillan v. B. L. Montague
Company," sets forth the basic principle that the right of
a defendant in a civil action to a trial in the county of his
residence is a substantial one, not to be lightly denied and
which cannot be defeated by joinder of a sham or immaterial
defendant. On these points, basic to our general law, the
Court has set forth an extensive listing of the supporting
South Carolina authorities. The original action had been
brought against two defendants but the trial judge later
granted a non-suit on behalf of the defendant upon the
basis of whose residence previous motions for a change of
venue had been denied. After the plaintiff had obtained
judgment, the trial judge set aside the verdict of the jury
and changed the place of trial to the county of residence
of the other defendant. The plaintiff appealed this decision,
but the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the change of
venue granted by the trial judge. The Court held that the
defendant had not waived its rights by not appealing from
the prior refusals of the trial judge to grant its motion
for a change of venue. The Court noted that the motion
had been renewed at every opportunity throughout the
proceeding and cited several instances wherein a change of
venue had been allowed at various stages of litigations. "Such
motions may be made upon the call of calendar for the Term
of Court for which the case is docketed for tiial,2 after a
*McKay, McKay, Black & Walker, Columbia, S. C.
**Attorney-At-Law, Columbia, S. C.
***Boyd, Bruton & Lumpkin, Columbia, S. C.
1. McMillan v. B. L. Montague Co., 238 S. C. 512, 121 S. E. 2d
13 (1961).
2. Witherspoon v. Spotts and Co., 227 S. C. 209, 87 S. E. 2d 417
(1955); Lee v. Neal, 233 S. C. 206, 104 S.E. 2d 291 (1958).
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mistrial,3 upon dismissal of a resident defendant, 4 or at
successive Terms of Court, 5 and after appeal to the Supreme Court resulting in elimination of one of the dedefendants."0 3 The Court held that no showing had been made
to counter the defendant's first motion for a change of
venue.
In the case of Bryan v. Richardson,7 the Supreme Court
again recognized that the South Carolina statutes and rules
for the making of a motion for a change of venue do not
prescribe any particular time limitation. The Court affirmed
the granting of plaintiff's motion for a change of venue on
the ground of convenience of witnesses and interest of justice
although the motion had been made more than two years
following the commencement of the action. The Court refused
to hold that the plaintiff had been guilty of laches or that
he had waived his statutory right to seek a change of venue.
Discovery
In the case of John Deere Company v. Cone,8 the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Richland County had ordered
the company to show cause why it should not withhold from
defendant's salary accrued alimony payable to his wife pursuant to a prior order of the court. The court further
directed that the company show to it from the original records
the amount of money advanced to the husband and the amount
repaid by him. The Supreme Court felt that the rule to show
cause issued by the court was in reality a subpoena duces
tecum insofar as it was purported to require production
of the company's original records. As such, the Court felt
that it was faulty and ineffectual since it had not been
directed to the custodian of the documents. The Court refused to sustain the procedure as valid under the discovery
provisions of the law because the company was not a party
to the action for back alimony payments and also held that
the rule was ineffectual as a subpoena in that the records
3. Hunter v. D. W. Alderman and Sons Co., 79 S. C. 555, 6 S. E. 202

(1908).

4. Tate and Thompson v. Blakely, 3 Hill 297, 21 S. C. L. 297 (1837);
City of Sumter v. U. S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 116 S. C. 29, 106 S. E. 778,
93 A. L. R. 949 (1921).
5. Blakely & Sopeland v. Frazier and Sanders, 11 S. C. 122 (1878).
6. Nehi-Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Chandler, 228 S. C. 412, 90 S. E.
2d 489 (1955).
7. Bryan v. Richardson, 240 S. C. 92, 124 S. E. 2d 731, (1962).
8. John Deere Co. v. Cone, 239 S. C. 597, 124 S. E. 2d 50 (1962).
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were located outside of the territory within the jurisdiction
of the court. On the last grounds, the Court also held invalid
a later section of the rule to show cause directing the President of the company in Illinois to answer interrogatories.
While the decision is harmonious with the general trend of
the South Carolina law, it points out the need for broadened
discovery procedures within the framework -of our practice.
In cases such as this most South Carolina attorneys now recognize that the Federal Rules provide a better opportunity for
the attorney to gather information within the control of
other parties or witnesses. Because of the strict interpretation of our statutory provisions relative to pre-trial discovery, legislative action to attain freer examination and
availability of pertinent facts for the parties to an action
is desirable.
Pleading
1. Demurrers.
In several cases the Supreme Court considered questions
raised by demurrers. In Oxman v. Sherman,9 the Court
repeated the well established rule that in ruling on demurrers,
the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and
given a liberal construction. In Wooten v. StandardLife and
Casualty Insurance Co.,1° the Court applied the above rule
to motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Court stated
that such motions are in the nature of a demurrer and, therefore, that they admit the allegations of the complaint as
true. The procedure was recognized as drastic but appropriate
where the other party's pleading is fatally deficient in substance. If there are material fact issues tendered by the
pleadings, the motion will be denied. The motion is allowable,
not for lack of proof, but for lack of an issue. Finding that
there were questions of fact present in the instant case, the
Court affirmed the trial judge's denial of judgment oin the
pleadings. In one case" the defendant hit upon a new method
of collecting open accounts. Plaintiff had purchased certain
furniture from the defendant but was delinquent in the payments thereon in the amount of $105.00. The defendant
ordered a diamond from the plaintiff worth in value approximately $1,500.00 which was delivered to the defendant to
9. Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S. C. 218, 122 S. E. 2d 559 (1961).
10. Wooten v. Standard Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 239 S. C. 243, 122
S. E. 2d 637 (1961).
11. Lorick v. Davis Furniture Co., 238 S. C. 229, 119 S. E. 2d 732 (1961).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 15
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 15

show her husband for his approval. Thereafter, the defendant
refused to even discuss the matter of the diamond until the
plaintiff returned the furniture purchased from the defendant.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging fraud and seeking to
recover actual and punitive damages in the sum of $10,000.00.
The defendant demurred on two grounds which the Court
actually separated into three. The trial judge overruled the
demurrer and the Court sustained his decision on the grounds
that the demurrer did not raise the issue of the sufficiency
of the complaint. The demurrer was addressed to the contract
involved whereas the action had been based not upon the
theory of the contract but rather for fraud and deceit.
In Collins v. Collins, 12 the Supreme Court held that it was
error for the trial judge not to accord the defendant opportunity to appear generally or answer upon the merits following
the denial of his demurrer by the trial judge. Under our
procedure,' a party should be allowed to plead over after
the denial of a demurrer unless it appears that the demurrer
was interposed in bad faith or for purposes of delay. It was
not suggested that the defendant had acted in bad faith or for
purposes of delay in this particular case. The rule cited
by the Court is well recognized, but in an earlier case, the
Supreme Court had refused to overrule a decision of a lower
court on this ground since in that case the defendant had
failed to seek from the Court permission to answer. 14 However, the statements of the Court in this regard are merely
dicta since the Court held that one of the co-trustees had
not been served by summons within the jurisdiction. At
the time of this case, the South Carolina statutes provided
no method for service upon a non-resident trustee of a trust
created by inter vivos gift. The statutes did provide for
service upon non-resident trustees in cases of a testamentary
trust by allowing service upon the probate judge for the
county in which the will was probated. 1 Subsequent to this
action, a statute was passed by the South Carolina Legislature
which allowed certain methods of service upon non-resident
12. Collins v. Collins, 239 S. C. 170, 122 S. E. 2d 1 (1961).
18. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 10-644 (1952).
14. De Pas v. City of Spartanburg, 190 S. C. 22, 1 S. E. 2d 914 (1938).
15. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 10-433

(1952)

as amended

by Act No. 456 (1955) ; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 67-53 (1952),
as amended by Act No. 1697 (1960). These sections were limited to applications for letters of appointment by a trustee to the probate court or
court of common pleas and, therefore, not applicable to inter vivos trutse.
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inter vivos trustees. 16 The new statute, while definitely
filling a need in the law, may pose questions of jurisdiction
that must be tested to determine their constitutionality. If
the trust assets can be found, a safer procedure might be
to acquire jurisdiction by attachment of the property or
res of the trust.
2. Replies.
In the case of Plummer v. Independent Life and Accident
Insurance Company,17 the Supreme Court dealt with the
matter of requiring plaintiff to reply to an answer. The
trial judge had refused to require a reply and the Court
recognized that such a decision was within the discretion of
the judge and subject to reversal only where clearly erroneous.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff is required to reply in cases where
the defendant in his answer sets up a release but in this
case plaintiff had referred to the release in the original complaint and alleged that it was fraudulently procured. In the
light of this fact, the Court felt that the answer did not
contain new matter requiring a reply.
Amendment of Pleadings
In our cases and in practice, the amendment of pleadings
has been liberally allowed. In the only case involving this
point,' the Supreme Court held that power to allow amendment of pleadings in the furtherance of justice is so broad
that its exercise by the trial court wil rarely "be disturbed,
because it will seldom happen that the Court will exceed its
power or abuse the discretion given it in such matters." In
this case, however, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to amend its answer so as to allege the defense of
fraud. The defendant had waited until only five days before
the commencement of the term at which the case was being
tried. The defendant was fully informed by the original
complaint of the nature of the cause of action against it and
the trial judge concluded that the defendant had not demonstrated the diligence required in proposing the amendment
The facts of this case are very strong and the case should
16. Act No. 810 (1962), see Acts and Joint Resolutions of the General
Assembly of South Carolina, Regular Session of 1962, p. 1955 (1962).
17. Plummer v. Independent Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 238 S. C. 313, 120
S. E. 2d 108 (1961).
18. Alamance Indus. v. Chesterfield Hosiery Mill, 239 S. C. 287, 122
S. E. 2d 648 (1961),
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not be taken as a sweeping limitation upon the right to
amend a pleading,
Set-Off and Counterclaim
In Ellison, et al v. Simmons, 19 the Court pursuant to the
Code, refused to allow the defendant to an action for wrongful
death to set-off or counterclaim for his personal injuries or
property damage arising from the accident on which suit had
been brought. Since a wrongful death action is brought for
the benefit of statutory beneficiaries and not for the estate
of the decedent, the logic of this decision is inescapable. The
remedy of the defendant was by separate suit against the
estate of the decedent. The same case also contains a considerable discussion of chaiges to the jury, illustrating, several
clearly established principles,, such as, the charge must be
considered as a whole and will not be reversible error unless
prejudice is shown.
Parties
In Bridges, et al v. Wyondotte Worsted Company, et a ,20
the Court refused to allow the joinder of an additional party
on motion of the defendant where this would prejudice the
rights of the plaintiff. The Court noted that the party was
not necessary to the controversy.

TRIAL

Evidence
Bolton2 l

plaintiff's attorney introduced into
In Harper v.
evidence the vial containing the enucleated eye of the plaintiff
wVhich was allegedly removed as 'a result of this accident.
'This evidence was allowed in over the objection of the defense
,counsel after the plaintiff's doitor witness had testified the
-eye had been removed as a result of injury received in the
accident.
Evidence is offered for the purpose of proving the existIt
ence or non-existence of some matter of fact .....
would have been proper to admit into evidence the removed eye of the respondent if such had been made for
19. Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S. C. 364, 120 S. E. 2d 209 (1961).
20. Bridges v. Wyondotte Worsted Co., 239 S. C. 37, 121 S. E. 2d 300
1961).
21. 239 S. C. 541, 124 S.B. 2d 54 (1962).
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the purpose of proving some disputed or contraverted
fact in issue. Here, there was no issue as to the removal
of the respondent's eye.
22
Citing a New York case, Rost v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.,
where a, childs foot had been run over by an electric car and
the amputated foot was displayed to show the size of the
child at the time of the injury, the child being present at the
trial and the defendant admitting the foot had been amputated,The Court conceded that it has the undoubted rule that
the exhibition of an injury or an injured member of the
body to the jury is proper where it is a subject of examiilation, if such examination is necessary to enable the
jury to understand the circumstances surrounding the
injury or to obtain a more comprehensive and intelligent
conception -of the conditions which existed when the
injury was received, or of the character of the injury
'itself, -but. stated where such .exhibition is not essential
or necessary -to enable the jury to better understand the
condition, or where the jury may be lead to an illegitimate
consideration on account thereof then it becomes improper.
" Our Court then said:
The exhibition of injuries should not be permitted where
such will not tend to throw any light on any issue in the
case nor should such exhibition be permitted where it
*
is apparently designed merely to excite pity and commiseration. ...
Exhibition of the enucleated eye of the respondent did
not tend to throw any light on any issue in this case. We
think the trial Judge committed error in permitting the
ifntroduction of the removed and preserved eye.
In the case of Turner v. Pilot Life Insurance Company 3 the
insurance company accepted the insured's check and an application for reinstatement after default. It waived its rights
to forfeiture within the time required to present the check
at the drawee bank and was liable although the bank dishonored the check because of the insured's intervening death,
even though the insured did not have sufficient funds in the
account to pay the check.
*

-

22. 10 App. Div. 477, 41 N. Y. S. 1069 (1896).

23. 238 S. C. 387, 120 S. E. 2d 223 (1961).
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The defendant insurance company, in addition, defended on
the grounds of suicide of the plaintiff's decedent. The insurance company attempted to introduce into evidence proof
of the defense of suicide. Appellant sought to show that just
prior to the insured's death he was in bad financial condition,
necessitating borrowing money to pay premiums; that he
carried far more life insurance than his meager income warranted; that he was short in his accounts as treasurer of the
local union; and that he was an experienced hunter, well
versed in handling fire arms (the plaintiff's decedent was
killed by a gun shot in the chest). The lower court did not
rule the proffered testimony incompetent but merely held
it would not be admitted until the appellant proved some
circumstances surrounding the insured's death indicating the
possibility of suicide. This the appellant could not do. The
lower court, therefore, rejected this evidence.
In affirming the lower court Mr. Justice Oxner said:
The trial Judge might well have concluded that it would
be highly prejudicial to admit testimony of this character
unless there was some other evidence supporting an inference of suicide. All that the proffered testimony
intended to show was motive. Although motive is a
circumstance to be considered in determining whether
or not death is the result of suicide, proof of motive
alone is insufficient to warrant submission of that issue
to the jury.
An insurance company, in Garrett v. Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Conpany2 4 being sued on a disability policy attempted to show, by cross examination of the plaintiff, he
received almost as much from his disability, because of disability policies with other companies, as he would have received
if he continued to work. The trial judge properly refused to
allow such cross examination.
It is well settled that the extent to which cross examination of a witness may go is a matter resting within the
discretion of the trial Judge. This rule is thus stated in
State v. Maxey, 218 S. C. 106, 62 S. E. 2d 100: The
general range and extent of cross examination is within
the discretion of the trial Judge, subject to the limitation
that it must relate to matters pertinent to the issue, or
to specific acts which tend to discredit the witness or
24. 239 S. C. 574, 124 S. E. 2d 36 (1962).
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impeach his moral character. The discretion of the trial
Court in allowing cross examination is not subject to
review except in cases of manifest abuse or injustice.
Intervening Negligence
25 our Court dealt with the question
v.
Porter,
In Matthews
of whether an intervening negligent act of the third party
exculpated the defendant from his original act of negligence.
The Court said it was a question of proximate cause.
To exculpate a negligent defendant, the intervening cause
must be one that breaks the sequence of causal connection
between the defendants negligence and the injury alleged.
The superseding act must so intervene as to exclude negligence of the defendant as one of the proximate causes
of the injury.
The defendant Porter had been involved in an accident
with an automobile operated by Issac Singletary. Apparently
this first accident was due to the negligence of the defendant,
Porter. The plaintiff Matthews was a trained nurse who stopped to render aid to the defendant's wife who was injured
in the initial accident. While standing next to the defendant's
automobile, a third party, McKnight, skidded sideways down
the highway and after striking another car crushed Matthews
between the car of the defendant Porter and the one driven by
McKnight resulting in personal injuries to the plaintiff. The
case was tried and resulted in a verdict of actual damages in
favor of the plaintiff respondent. The defendant appealed
and among his grounds was the exception that the injuries
received by the plaintiff were due to and caused by the
intervening negligence of McKnight.
The Court said:
Our decisions are to the effect that liability exists for
the natural and probable consequences of negligent acts
or admissions proximately flowing therefrom. The intervening negligence of the third party will not excuse
the first wrongdoer, if such intervention ought to have
been foreseen in the exercise of due care. In such a case,
the original negligence remains active and a contributing
cause to the injury. The test is to be found in the probable
consequences reasonably to be anticipated, and not in the
number or exact character of the events subsequently
arising.
25. 239 S. C. 620, 124 S. E. 2d 321 (1962).
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The defendant further alleged it was the duty of the police
making the investigation of the initial accident to warn other
persons travelling on the highway of the existence of wrecked
automobiles blocking their road of travel.
The Court in answering this said:
In an action for injury alleged to be due to the neglect of
duty on the part of the defendant, it is no defense that
a similar duty rested upon another person. One upon
whom the law devolves a duty cannot shift it to another,
so as to exonerate himself from the consequences of its
non performance. Since the appellant's negligence had
caused the highway at the scene of the collision to be
blocked, it was his duty to warn others using the highway
of the dangerous condition he created. He could not
delegate this duty to another, even though he was a law
enforcement officer, and escape the consequence for its
non performance by such officer.
Absent Witness
The "absent witness" doctrine was raised in the case of
26
Matthews v. Porter.
In that case the defendant sought to explain why his wife
was not present to testify at the trial. He testified she was
asleep when the first collision took place and at the time of
the second collision his wife was lying across the front seat
of his car and due to her condition and position she did not
see the second collision.
Upon cross examination of the appellant by counsel for the
respondent he was asked if his wife had made claim against
him for her injuries. The appellant's counsel objected but
after deliberation the trial court allowed the question which
was answered in the affirmative. The defendant asserted
it was error for the trial judge to permit the counsel for the
respondent to examine him in regard to a claim made against
him by his wife, asserting that this examination inferred to
the jury that the appellant had liability insurance and such
testimony was prejudicial.
Again our Court stated the rule:
It is well settled in this state if a party fails to produce
the testimony of an available witness on a material issue
26. 239 S. C. 620, 124 S. t. 2d 321 (1962).
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in the cause, it may be inferred that such testimony if
presented would be adverse to the party who failed to call
the witness. Generally the rule above stated is applied
when the uncalled witness is a relative of the party failing
to call such witness or within some degree of control of
the said party. It was proper for the appellant to testify
as to the reason for his wife's absence and to explain
that she did not have any knowledge of the facts surrounding the collision. The respondent had the right to
cross examine the appellant and rebut the explanation
made by him of his wife's absence. The testimony elicited
on cross examination tended to show another reason for
the absence of the wife of the appellant and to disprove
the explanation made by him. We do not think the cross
examination of the appellant created the inference he
had liability insurance.
Jury Argument
Our Supreme Court in the case of Theresa Harper v. Pattie
Bolton,2 7 put South Carolina among the states which opposed
the demonstrative use of the blackboard by an attorney, over
the objection of opposing counsel, to write his own opinion as
to the per diem value which the jury should award for pain
and suffering.
To permit plaintiff's counsel to suggest and argue to the
jury an amount to be allowed for pain and suffering,
mental anguish and disability calculated on a daily or
other fixed basis allows him to invade the province of the
jury and get before it what does not appear in the evidence. Since an expert witness would not be permitted
to testify as to the market value of pain and suffering,
which differs in individuals and the degree thereof may
vary from day to day, certainly there is all the more
reason for counsel not to do so. The estimates of counsel
may tend to instill in the minds of the jury impressions
not found in the evidence. Verdicts should be based ori
deductions drawn by the jury from the evidence presented
and not the mere adoption of calculation submitted by
counsel.
The Court said to allow counsel to endorse on a blackboard
his own opinion as to the per diem value of pain and suffering
27. 239 S. C. 541, 124 S. E. 2d 54 (1962).
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was to permit him to make an argument that had no foundation whatsoever in evidence.
Though wide latitude and freedom of counsel in arguments
to the jury are and ought to be allowed such arguments
cannot be based on facts not on the record, or inferences
based on or drawn from the facts which are not even
admissible in evidence.
The Court was careful to reiterate however, there is no
impropriety of counsels' use of the blackboard, during his
argument to the jury, for the purpose of fairly illustrating
points that are properly arguable or bringing to the attention
of the jury, facts or figures properly revealed in the evidence.
28
Johnson v. C and WC Railway Company:
Calculations made or diagrams drawn (on the blackboard) are, of course, not evidence. Like statements of
counsel and oral argument they should have reasonable
foundation and evidence on inference barely arguable
from the evidence. Just as oral arguments may be abused
so may such visual arguments; and its abuse may be so
flagrant as to require a new trial. Control of the arguments of counsel, with regards to the use of such visual
aids, as with regard to oral statements, rests in the sound
discretion of the trial Judge.
The defendant at the conclusion of the jury arguments requested the trial judge to charge the following: Garrett v.
20
Mutual Benefit.
I charge you that you are not to consider whether this
plaintiff drew only $250 per month in disability payments
as against a larger amount which he earned when actually
working, because this is not an issue, it being solely
whether the plaintiff is disabled under the terms of the
policy.
This charge was requested by the defendant solely on the
ground that the attorneys for the plaintiff had allegedly
argued to the jury that the plaintiff would not quit a job
making nearly Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars per year
in order to draw Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars per
month disability insurance income if he was not in fact
totally disabled. The defendant contends that the requested
28. 234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 777 (1959).
29. 239 S. C. 574, 124 S. E. 2d 36 (1962).
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charge was proper in view of the foregoing argument since
the Court had previously excluded testimony (which it attempted to elicit on cross examination) that showed the
•disability income of plaintiff from all companies to be $550.00
per month.
The Supreme Court said:
No objection was interposed to the challenged argument
at the time and the record fails to disclose the argument
made . . The order of the trial Judge refusing the
motion for a new trial indicates that there was doubt in
his mind as to the nature of the argument made, since
objection thereto was not made at the time so that it could
be entered in the record.
It is the duty of counsel to make timely objection to argument considered improper, so that the challenged argument can be entered in the record and a ruling then made
by the trial Judge thereabout. Where this is not done, as
here, and the alleged improper remarks are not set out in
the record, exceptions to the refusal of the trial Judge to
grant a new trial because of improper remarks by counsel
will not be considered on appeal.
The Court again reaffirmed the rule: "Since only one
reasonable inference can be properly deduced from the evidence it was a question of law for the Court and not a question
-of fact for the jury." Moore v. Palmetto Bank and Textile
Insurance Company.8 0 In Mungo v. Bennett,81 the appellant
contended a directed verdict should have been granted upon
the grounds the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
the evidence is the respondent was contributorily negligent.
"Under our decision the affirmative defense of contributory
megligence rarely becomes a question of law for the Court."
Judicial Discretion
In case of Lester C. Miller v. British America Assurance
Vompany,8 2 plaintiff appellant instituted their cause of action
;as one at law. The defendant set up as an equitable defense
.an arbitration agreement and asked for an interlocutory injunction based on such special equitable defense.
30. 238 S. C. 341, 120 S. E. 2d 231 (1961).
31. 238 S. C. 79, 119 S. E. 2d 522 (1961).

32. 238 S. C. 94, 119 S. E. 2d 527 (1961).
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Our Supreme Court said:
. ;1
It is within the discretion of the presiding Judge to tryeither the equity or law issue first but those issues should
be tried first which are likely to result in a final judgment, and render unnecessary the consideration of the
other issues.
It is discretionary with the trial judge, after the plaintiff
has closed his case, to permit him to reopen and allow the
introduction of additional evidence, after the motion for non
suit has been made.
The respondent in the case of Rakestraw v. Allstate In8 produced a copy of an insurance policysurance CompanyM
and agreed it could be used in lieu of the original. It was
distinctly understood the respondent-was not introducing the
policy in evidence but merely making it available to the,
plaintiff appellant for introduction. The appellant failed to
introduce the copy of the evidence and at the conclusion of
the plaintiff's case the trial judge granted a non suit on the
grounds:
(1) that the appellant had failed to prove that he camewithin the terms of the coverage provided in the contract
of insurance between the respondent and Ann Hauser
McKinney, for the reason that he had not introduced thepolicy of insurance in evidence; and (2) that the appellant failed to prove that he, was occupying the insured
automobile at the time he sustained bodily injury in the
operation thereof with the permission of the insured.
When the trial judge indicated he was going to grant a
non suit, the attorney for the appellant moved to reopen his
case and to allow him to introduce into evidence the policy"
of insurance in question. The motion was denied. It appears
from the record the plaintiff's counsel did not rely, for his
failure to introduce the policy in question, upon accident,
inadvertence, mistake or misapprehension as to the necessityfor offering the policy.
The Supreme Court said:
Since counsel for the appellant did not plead oversight,
surprise, mistake or inadvertence, in the absence of which,
and under all the circumstances here, we find no abuse of
33. 238 S. C. 217, 119 S. E. 2d '746 (1961).
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discretion on the part of the trial Judge in refusing to
permit the appellant to reopen his case -and offer the,
policy of insurance as additional evidence.
Reiterated in the Rakestraw case is the rule a party is
bound by the testimony of his own witnesses where the party
did not prove facts to be otherwise than such witness testified
them to be.
Citing Brissie v. Southern Railway Company3 4 which was
an action by an administrator against the railroad for the
death of his intestate:
The engineer of the train was placed upon the stand by
the plaintiff, who testified to the circumstances of the
death of the plaintiff's intestate. This court held that
when the plaintiff placed the train engineer on the stand,
he, thereby, became the plaintiff's witness and he was
bound by the engineer's testimony.
Although it has been held where a party calls a witness in
his behalf he may not impeach him or contradict him, he may
prove facts to be other than his-witness testified them to be.
However in the Rakestraw case the, appellant did not prove
the facts to be other than his witness testified them to be.
Hence he was bound by the testimony of his own witness.
APPEAL AND ERROR

The Court's decisions in the area of Appeal and Error were
largely a restatement of settled principles of the law.
Contentions not raised below not subject to consideration
by Supreme Court
Several cases demonstrated the importance of raising, either
in the pleadings, at the trial, or on appropriate motions after
trial, the contentions the appellant intends to make on appeal.
Although the Court may, in order to clear up possible confusion in an area of law, pass on such contentions which were
not raised below, (e.g., McElveen v. Stokes,)3 5 the Court
usually will not pass upon them.30
34. 209 S. C. 503, 41 S. E. 2d 97 (1947).
35. 240 S. C. 1, 124 S. E. 2d 592 (1962).
36. Ulmers v. Willingham, 238 S. C. 503, 120 S. E. 2d 859

(1961);

Stanley v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 S. C. 533, 121 S. E. 2d 10 (1961);
Florence v. Turbeville, 239 S. C. 126, 121 S. E. 2d 437 (1961);.
Frederick v. Standard Warehouse Co., 239 S. C. 216, 122 S. E. 2d 425
(1961); Atlantic Discount Corp. v. Driskell, 239 S. C. 500, 123 S. E. 2d
832 (1962).
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For the practitioner, Ulmers v. WillinghaM37 showed the
danger of a frequent practice. At the conclusion of the
trial, defendant moved for a new trial without stating
any grounds or argument. By agreement, the motion was
marked argued, and the trial judge denied the motion.
On appeal, the Court held that since no grounds were presented to the lower court, there was nothing for the Supreme
Court, to pass on.
Supreme Court Practice
The Court stated in MeElveen v. Stokes, 8 that an exception
taken but not argued in the Supreme Court will be deemed
abandoned. And in Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc.,3 9 the
Court pointed out the necessity of putting all matters to be
considered by the Court in the transcript. In that case, the
appellant quoted from the trial record in one of his exceptions,
which was deemed improper and was not subject to the Court's
consideration.
Consideration of Evidence on Motions for Nonsuit,
Directed Verdict, Judgment N.O.V., or New Trial
The Court reaffirmed its well-settled rule that in reviewing
the trial judge's ruling on motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., or new trial, the Court will review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. 40
Damages
The Court held, in two cases, that it would not set aside a
jury verdict for excessiveness unless the verdict was so
shockingly high that it indicates the jury acted from passion,
prejudice, corruption, or a disregard of the facts or the instructions of the Court. 41 However, the Court itself may order
a new trial nisi, if the damages awarded can be separated and
some element thereof is improper.42 The Court also held that
37. Ulmers v. Willingham, 238 S. C. 503, 120 S. E. 2d 859 (1961).
38. 240 S. C. 1, 124 S. E. 2d 592 (1962).
39. 240 S. C. 26, 124 S. E. 2d 585 (1962).
40. King v. J. C. Penney Co., 238 S. C. 336, 120 S. E. 2d 229 (1961);
Margolis v. Telech, 239 S. C. 232, 122 S. E. 2d 417 (1961); Jumper v.
Goodwin, 239 S. C. 508, 123 S. E. 2d 857 (1962).
41. Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., Inc., 240 S. C. 46, 124 S. E. 2d 580
(1962); Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S. C. 26, 124 S. E. 2d 858
1962).
42. Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 240 S. C. 75, 124 S. E.
2d 602 (1962) ; Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S. C. 508, 123 S. E. 2d 857 (1962).
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it could not consider a jury's failure to award punitive damages
as conclusive that the jury found the defendant not guilty of
was diswilfulness, because the question of punitive damages
43
cretionary with the jury, if it found wilfulness.
Miscellaneous
The Court held in Donkle v. Forster,44 that an order for
a new trial, based on a consideration of the facts, is not reviewable by the Supreme Court. And the Court reaffirmed
a well known rule that a conflict in evidence even as to the
application of an insurance policy exclusion clause, is for
the jury.45

48. Jumper v. Goodwin, 289 S. 0. 508, 123 S. E. 2d 857 (1962).

44. 238 S. C. 90, 119 S. E. 2d 281 (1961).
45. Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 238 S. C. 199, 119 S. E. 2d 685
(1961)..
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